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This paper addresses the question whether and how co-
benefits, through disaster resilience building, can be further 
promoted.  Co-benefits are defined as positive externalities 
that arise deliberately as a result of a joint strategy that 
pursues several objectives synergistically at the same time, 
such as disaster risk management and development goals, 
or disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. 
Of particular interest is the question of how the economic 
and broader benefits of disaster risk management can be 
recognized and realized by those in charge of fiscal policy 
decisions. The paper considers the interplay between public 
disaster risk management investment and fiscal policy, and 
provides an overview of the current debate as well as assess-
ment methods, tools, and policy options. In fiscal budgeting, 
it has been standard practice to focus on direct liabilities and 
recurrent spending. Costs of disasters are often dealt with 
after the fact only, rather than being considered as contin-
gent liabilities. As a consequence, the full costs of disasters 
have often not been budgeted for, and, with a price signal 
missing, there is lack of clear incentives for investing in 
disaster risk management. Overall, the paper identifies four 
steps and three dividends to be harnessed: (i) understanding 
fiscal risk; (ii) protecting public finance through risk financ-
ing instruments, the first dividend; (iii) managing disaster 
risk comprehensively, the second dividend; and (iv) pursuing 
a synergistic, co-benefits strategy of concurrently managing 
disaster risks and promoting development, the third dividend.
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1 Introduction:	From	understanding	risk	to	building	
fiscal	resilience		
	
Overview	
Disaster	risk	has	seen	strongly	increasing	recognition	by	research,	policy	and	
implementation	over	the	last	few	years.	Substantial	investments	into	disaster	
risk	management	(DRM)	have	been	made	and,	according	to	some	accounts,	the	
balance	between	wait‐and	see	(ex‐post	relief	and	reconstruction	funding)	and	
proaction	(ex‐ante	investments	into	DRM)	has	been	shifted	from	95%	vs.	5%	a	
decade	 back	 to	 about	 87%	 vs.	 13%	 (Kellet	 and	 Caravani,	 2012).	 Economic	
decision‐support	 tools	 have	 helped	 to	 understand	 the	 benefits	 of	 DRM	 and	
shown	substantial	dividends	from	DRM	(see	UK	Government	Office	for	Science,	
2012).		
	
Yet,	more	 effort	 is	 needed	 to	 further	 shift	 this	 balance.	 The	 recent	 UNISDR	
Global	Assessment	reports	(UNISDR	2013&2015a)	issue	a	stark	warning	that	
economic	 losses	 linked	to	disasters	are	“out	of	control”	and	will	continue	to	
escalate	unless	DRM	becomes	a	core	part	of	business	 investment	 strategies.	
The	 World	 Bank’s	 World	 Development	 Report	 2014	 (World	 Bank,	 2013)	
emphasizes	the	need	to	further	switch	from	unplanned	and	ad	hoc	responses	
to	proactive	and	systematic	risk	management.	As	well,	recent	IPCC	assessment	
reports	(IPCC	2012,	2014)	emphasize	the	need	for	risk	based	assessment	and	
careful	management	planning	before	disasters	strike.	Finally,	 the	 last	Global	
Risk	Report	published	by	the	World	Economic	Forum	(WEF,	2015)	concludes	
that	 stronger	 efforts	 are	 needed	 to	 understand,	 measure	 and	 foresee	 the	
evolution	of	interdependencies	of	risk.	
	
Governments	at	different	scales	are	 important	actors	 in	DRM.	 In	addition	to	
providing	DRM,	regulating	private	sector	activity,	promoters	and	coordinators	
of	collective	action	on	DRM	(Wilkinson,	2012),	they	are	risk‐takers,	as	a	large	
part	of	disaster	risk	ends	up	with	the	fiscal	position	(Mechler,	2004).	Over	the	
last	few	years,	there	has	been	increasing	recognition	and	understanding	of	the	
need	to	deliberately	consider	this	in	public	and	fiscal	risk	planning	for	disasters	
and	implement	disaster	risk	reduction	(DRM)	to	the	extent	possible.		
	
Approach		
This	paper	provides	reflection	on	the	benefits	of	DRM	in	the	context	of	fiscal	
policy	and	public	 investment,	addressing	the	question	whether	and	how	co‐
benefits	through	disaster	resilience	building	can	be	further	promoted.		In	line	
with	 the	 literature,	we	define	 co‐benefits	 as	positive	 externalities	 that	 arise	
deliberately	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 joint	 strategy	 that	 pursues	 several	 objectives	
	 3	
synergistically	at	the	same	time,	such	as	DRM	and	development	goals,	or	DRM	
and	climate	change	adaptation	(see	Hourcade	et	al,	2001).1		
	
Of	particular	interest	for	the	following	debate	is	the	question	of	how	economic	
and	broader	benefits	of	DRM	can	be	recognized	and	realized	by	those	in	charge	
of	 fiscal	 policy	 decisions.	 The	 discussion	 considers	 the	 interplay	 between	
public	DRM	investment	and	fiscal	policy	and	provides	an	overview	of	current	
debate	as	well	as	assessment	methods,	tools	and	policy	options.	Currently,	in	
fiscal	budgeting	practice	it	is	mostly	standard	to	focus	on	direct	liabilities	and	
recurrent	 spending,	 such	 as	 foreign	 and	 domestic	 sovereign	 borrowing,	
expenditures	 by	 budget	 law,	 future	 recurrent	 costs	 of	 public	 investment	
projects,	and	pension	and	health	care	expenditure.	Costs	of	disasters	are	often	
dealt	 with	 after	 the	 fact	 only	 rather	 than	 being	 considered	 as	 contingent	
liabilities.	As	a	consequence,	the	full	costs	of	disasters	are	not	budgeted	for	and	
with	a	price	signal	missing	there	is	lack	of	clear	incentives	for	investing	in	DRM.	
	
Charting	out	progress	
The	following	discussion	traces	progress	in	the	debate	on	fiscal	disaster	risk	
management	 by	 focussing	 strongly	 on	 analytics	 and	 current	 practice	 (see	
figure	1).	We	overall	identify	four	steps,	which	are	being	pursued	deliberately,	
as	well	as	three	dividends,	which	are	being	harnessed	(see	also	ODI	&	World	
Bank,	2015).	
	
(i) Understanding	 fiscal	 risk‐	 identifying	 and	 assessing	 the	 relevance	 of	
disaster	risk	for	public	finance;	
(ii) Protecting	 public	 finance	 through	 risk	 financing	 instruments	 –	
identifying	and	examining	insurance‐related	instruments	that	support	
protection	of	the	fiscal	position	‐	the	1st	dividend;	
(iii) Comprehensively	managing	disaster	 risk	 including	 risk	 reduction	and	
risk	preparedness	as	they	affect	development	–	the	2nd	dividend;	
(iv) Pursuing	 a	 synergistic,	 co‐benefits	 based,	 strategy	 of	 concurrently	
managing	disaster	risks	and	promoting	development	–	the	3rd	dividend.	
	
																																																								
1	In	contrast,	ancillary	benefits	are	additional	benefits	that	arise	without	deliberate	planning.	
Similarly,	there	may	also	be	co‐costs	from	projects	and	policies.	This	is	not	the	topic	of	this	
chapter,	but	will	need	attention	further	on.	
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Figure	1 Tracing	progress	in	debate	and	practice:	From	acts	of	god	to	DRM	as	part	of	
fiscal	risk	management	
	
Specifically,	the	paper	aims	at	providing	an	analytical	assessment	with	a	‘user	
focus'	based	on	 the	 following	broad	guiding	question:	How	can	 the	 findings	
support	government’s	DRM	investment	decisions	as	a	public	good?	We	provide	
empirical	evidence,	seek	to	identify	good/bad	practices	in	fiscal	policy	design	
and	 contextualize	 the	 discussion	 with	 relevant	 country‐level	 and	 regional	
examples,	 such	 as	 from	 Mexico,	 the	 Caribbean	 states	 and	 OECD	 countries.	
Overall,	 we	 seek	 to	 distill	 entry	 points	 for	 more	 strongly	 recognizing	 and	
realizing	the	economic	and	broader	benefits	of	DRM	by	those	in	charge	of	fiscal	
policy.		Specifically,	we	identify	current	guiding	principles	and	aims	for	fiscal	
policy,	 then	discuss	 if	and	how	those	can	be	amended	to	support	DRM.	 	The	
ensuing	discussion	is	organized	according	to	the	four	steps	and	dividends	and	
finally	leads	into	a	short	conclusions	section,	which	provides	final	commentary	
regarding	the	ongoing	transition,	which	increasingly	positions	disaster	risk	as	
part	and	parcel	of	resilience	strategies	to	harness	co‐benefits	from	managing	
disaster	risk	and	stimulating	development.	
2 Understanding	fiscal	risk		
	
A	first	logical	step	for	managing	(fiscal)	risk,	which	is	commonly	pursued,	is	to	
properly	understand	and	put	risk	in	the	proper	context	of	fiscal	operations,	for	
which	considerable	effort	has	been	expanded	over	the	last	few	years.	
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Natural	 disasters	 lead	 to	 loss	 of	 life	 and	 assets	 and	 have	 large	 impacts	 on	
people,	 businesses	 and	 governments.	 Governments	 at	 different	 scales	 are	
decisive	to	assessing,	reducing	and	financing	disaster	risk.	From	an	economic	
perspective,	governments	are	exposed	 to	natural	disaster	 risk	and	potential	
losses	due	to	three	functions:	(i)	the	allocation	of	goods	and	services	(security,	
education,	 clean	 environment),	 (ii)	 the	 provision	 of	 support	 to	 private	
households	and	business	in	the	case	of	market	failure,	(iii)	and	the	distribution	
of	income	(Mechler,	2004;	see	Musgrave,	1959).	From	a	budgeting	perspective,	
sovereign	disaster	risk	arises	as	a	contingent	public	sector	 liability,	which	is	
associated	with	government’s	functions	to	provide	relief,	support	to	recovery,	
undertake	 reconstruction	 and	 raise	 tax	 revenue.	 Once	 a	 disaster	 hits,	 these	
contingent	 liabilities	 can	 lead	 to	 large	 costs	 accruing	 to	 governments	 for	
providing	relief,	recovery	and	reconstruction	assistance	(see	Box	1).		
	
Box	1:	Government	operations	and	costs	post	disaster	
	
Relief	operations	include	emergency	assistance	provided	to	the	affected	population	to	meet	
basic	needs,	such	as	shelter,	food	and	medical	attention.			
Early	recovery	operations	following	the	initial	relief	efforts	are	crucial	to	limit	secondary	
losses	 and	 ensure	 that	 reconstruction	 can	 start	 promptly.	 They	 include	 the	 emergency	
restoration	 of	 lifeline	 infrastructure	 (e.g.,	 water,	 electricity	 and	 transportation	 lines),	 the	
removal	of	debris,	and	the	like.		
Reconstruction	operations	generally	center	on	the	rehabilitation	or	replacement	of	assets	
damaged	by	a	disaster.	These	include	public	facilities	and	infrastructure,	which	are	the	direct	
responsibility	of	the	state,	but	national	or	municipal	authorities	usually	face	obligations	that	
go	beyond	their	own	assets.	Governments	often	are	called	on	to	subsidize	the	reconstruction	
of	 private	 assets,	 in	 particular	 housing	 for	 low‐income	 families	who	 could	 not	 otherwise	
afford	to	rebuild	their	homes.	
Loss	of	tax	revenue	arises	as	the	economy	is	depressed	and	needs	time	to	recover.		
	
Source:	World	Bank,	2010a	
2.1 Coping	with	risk:	Understanding	risk	tolerance	and	the	need	to	
plan	
	
As	disaster	risk	is	a	liability,	the	question	arises	whether	governments	should	
take	disaster	risk	into	account	explicitly	or	can	they	afford	a	responsive	mode	
of	 operations?	 A	 seminal	 paper	 by	 Arrow	 and	 Lind	 (1970)	 on	 the	 role	 of	
sovereign	 risk	 preference	 proposed	 that	 governments	 should	 behave	
(disaster)	risk‐neutrally,	as	they	are	considered	the	entity	best	suited	to	deal	
with	risk	via	efficiently	pooling	and	spreading	potential	losses.	More	precisely,	
the	argument	did	not	favor	neglecting	risk;	rather	Arrow	and	Lind	suggested	a	
fiscal	 management	 approach	 based	 on	 expected	 values	 only:	 "[…]	 the	
government	should	behave	as	an	expected‐value	decision	maker"	(Arrow	and	
Lind	1970).	This	means	governments,	as	they	can	afford	to	refinance	quickly,	
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should	only	plan	for	and	reserve	for	average	costs	incurred	over	longer	time	
horizon,	and	thus	would	not	need	to	pay	close	attention	to	variability	in	costs	
which	 is	arises	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	disasters	are	high‐impact‐low	 frequency	
events	(thus	are	defined	by	strong	volatility	around	the	mean).	
	
Challenging	Arrow‐Lind	
Over	the	last	few	years,	it	has	been	recognized	that	variability	matters	and	that	
countries	exhibit	differential	coping	capacity	for	dealing	with	risk	(see	box	2).	
	
Box	2:	Understanding	risk	preference:	the	case	of	US	and	Haiti		
Figure	 2	 shows	 differential	 coping	 capacity	 contrasts	 recent	 large	 disasters	 in	 two	 very	
countries	with	extremely	differential	coping	capacity	–	the	USA	and	Haiti.	While	in	the	USA,	
Hurricane	Katrina	caused	colossal	losses	of	about	USD	125	billion,	this	amounted	to	less	than	
1	per‐cent	of	GDP.	In	comparison,	while	the	absolute	losses	for	Haiti	were	smaller,	in	terms	
of	relative	losses	they	were	tremendous	at	more	than	160	percent	of	their	GDP,	and	serious	
negative	 fiscal	 and	macro‐economic	 effects	 have	 to	 be	 expected	 in	 the	medium‐to	 longer	
term,	although	in	practice	these	effects	are	often	not	monitored	and	difficult	to	isolate	from	
the	background	noise	(see	Noy,	2009).	By	all	means,	however,	comprehensively	spreading	
the	losses	using	tax	revenue	or	savings	seems	impossible	for	Haiti.	This	is	also	partly	due	to	
the	smaller	population,	and	small	total	area	of	Haiti	as	well	as	relative	low	tax	revenues	in	
terms	of	GDP.	
	
	Figure	2.	Differential	ability	to	spread	risk	for	two	large	disasters	in	the	US	and	Haiti.	
Source:	Mechler	and	Hochrainer‐Stigler,	2014	
	
Practically,	the	Arrow‐Lind	theorem	has	been	challenged	on	theoretial	grounds	
and	 the	 case	 for	 risk	 aversion	 has	 been	 understood	 (Priest,	 2003;	Mechler	
2004;	 Hochrainer,	 2006;	 Ghesquiere	 and	Mahul,	 2007;	 Anginer	 et	 al.	 2013;	
Mechler	and	Hochrainer‐Stigler,	2014).	However,	only	a	few	of	these	analyses	
(Mechler	2004;	Hochrainer,	2006;	Ghesquiere	and	Mahul,	2007;	Mechler	and	
Hochrainer‐Stigler,	 2014)	 explicitly	 studied	 and	 criticized	 the	 details	 of	 the	
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theorem	for	 the	disaster	dimension.	 	Broadly,	 the	Arrow‐Lind	theorem	does	
not	 apply	 to	 	 governments	 of	 countries	 that	 exhibit	 some	 of	 	 the	 following	
characteristics	 (see	 Mechler,	 2004;	 Mechler	 and	 Hochrainer,	 2014),	 and	 in	
these	cases	governments	should		justifiably	act	as	risk‐averse	agents.	
	
 High	natural	hazard	exposure;		
 Economic	activity	clustered	in	a	limited	number	of	areas	with	key	public	
infrastructure	exposed	to	natural	hazards;	and	
 Constraints	 on	 resources	 to	 finance	 disaster	 losses	 and	 associated	
requirements.	Such	sources	are	determined	by	the	ability	to	reallocate	
the	budget,	domestic	savings,	access	 to	 financial	markets,	and	 level	of	
external	indebtedness.	
	
While	 income	 is	 not	 the	 sole	 defining	 variable	 for	 risk	 coping	 and	 risk	
preference,	 it	 is	 informative	 to	 compare	 income	 to	 losses	 in	 large	 event	 to	
understand	where	to	look	and	where	to	prioritize	action.	As	figure	3	suggests,	
while	 absolute	 damages	 (losses)	 hve	 been	 concntdrated	 in	 higher	 income	
countries,	 in	 lower	income	and	particularly	in	small	 island	states	(SIDS),	the	
relative	burdens	have	been	found	to	be	much	larger	(e.g.	more	than	300%	of	
GDP	in	SIDS	(World	Bank,	2013).	
	
		
Figure	3	Country	income	groups	and	disaster	losses.		Source:	World	Bank,	2013		
	
If	risk	aversion	is	identified	as	the	proper	risk	preference,	this	implies	that	risk	
has	to	be	taken	into	account	explicitly	(and	beyond	average	values)	in	budget	
and	fiscal	planning.	A	government	then	should	go	beyond	being	an	‘expected	
value	‘decision‐maker,	and	consider	variability	and	risk	properly.	
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2.2 Tools	and	concepts:	The	fiscal	risk	and	hedge	matrices	
	
Budget	and	resource	planning	for	disasters	is	not	an	easy	proposition.	Applying	
the	so‐called	fiscal	risk	matrix	is	a	step	forward.	Governments	commonly	plan	
and	 budget	 for	 direct	 liabilities,	 that	 is,	 liabilities	 that	 manifest	 themselves	
through	 certain	 and	 annually	 recurrent	 expenditure.	 Those	 liabilities	 are	
termed	 explicit	 (as	 recognized	 by	 law	 or	 contract),	 or	 implicit	 (moral	
obligations).	 In	contrast,	disaster	risk	enters	the	balance	sheet	as	contingent	
liabilities	(marked	in	red	in	table	1),	i.e.	obligations	that	arise	randomly	when	
a	 particular	 event	 occurs.	 Explicit,	 contingent	 liabilities	 deal	 with	 the	
reconstruction	 of	 infrastructure	 destroyed	 by	 events,	 whereas	 implicit	
obligations	are	associated	with	providing	relief	–	commonly	considered	as	a	
moral	liability	for	governments	(Polackova	Brixi	and	Mody,	2002).	
	
Table	1 Government	liabilities:	the	fiscal	risk	matrix	
Liabilities	 Direct	
Obligation	in	any	event	
Contingent	
Obligation	if	a	particular	
event	occurs	
Explicit	
Government	liability	
recognized	by	law	or		
contract	
 Foreign	and	domestic	
sovereign	borrowing,		
 Expenditures	by	budget	law	
and	budget	expenditures	
 State	guarantees	for	non‐
sovereign	borrowing	and	
public	and	private	sector	
entities	
 Reconstruction	of	public	
assets	
Implicit	
A	“moral”	obligation	
of	the	government	
 Pension	and	health	care	
expenditure		
 Future	recurrent	costs	of	
public	investment	projects	
 Default	of	subnational	
government	or	public	or	
private	entities,		
 Banking	failure	
 Disaster	relief	and	
recovery	assistance	
Source:	Modified	after	Polackova	Brixi	and	Modi,	2002.	Note:	DRM	relevant	items	in	red.	
	
	
Similarly	 to	 the	 fiscal	 risk	matrix,	 a	 fiscal	 hedge	matrix	 can	 be	 established,	
which	 would	 identify	 the	 sources	 governments	 have	 available	 to	 generate	
resources	generally	and	in	future	(contingent)	events	(table	2).		Risk	financing	
would	thus	fall	under	the	explicit	contingent	sources	for	coping	with	disaster	
losses.	
	
Table	2 Government	sources:	the	fiscal	hedge	matrix	
Liabilities	 Direct	
Sources	in	any	event	
Contingent	
Sources	if	a	particular	event	occurs	
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Explicit	
Direct	control	by	
Government		
	
 Tax	revenues	(less	
tax	expenditures)		
 Government‐owned	
assets	for	possible	
sale	or	lease	
 Transfer	income	from	the	central	
government	
 Recovery	of	loans	made	by	
government	(on‐lending)		
 Legal	claims	against	the	state	
 Reserve	funds	
 Contingent	credit	lines	and	
financing	commitments	from	
official	creditors		
 Sovereign	insurance	
	
Implicit	
Not	directly	
controlled	by	
Government		
	
Existing	funds	that	are	
under	indirect	
government	control	
(social	security	funds)	
 Future	profits	of	state‐owned	
enterprises	and	agencies		
Source:	Modified	after	Polackova	Brixi	and	Modi,	2002.	Note:	DRM‐relevant	sources	in	red.	
	
Three	key	types	of	government	risk	financing	are	worth	noting	in	relation	to	
disasters	 (and	 will	 be	 discussed	 further	 below):	 reserve	 funds,	 contingent	
credit	lines,	and	sovereign	insurance	(traditional	or	alternative).		
2.3 Evidence	of	planning	for	contingent	liabilities	
	
Historically,	countries	have	generally	not	planned	for	contingent	liabilities,	and	
using	ex‐post	sources	such	as	budget	reallocations,	aid	and	emergency	loans	
have	financed	disaster	losses.	Large,	developed	countries	have	relied	on	their	
national	reserve	funds,	the	reallocation	of	the	budget	(existing	tax	revenue)	or	
new	tax	revenue	to	fund	the	aftermath	of	disaster	event,	and	those	countries	
have	done	less	fiscal	planning	for	disaster	risk	(see	e.g.,	UNESCAP	2013).	OECD	
and	larger	countries	can	generally	absorb	the	impact	of	adverse	natural	events	
since	revenues	from	unaffected	regions	can	subsidize	the	affected	region.		
	
Among	others,	the	fiscal	risk	matrix	has	seen	application	in	Mexico,	Colombia,	
Thailand	and	Indonesia	with	reference	to	disaster	risk.	Colombia	has	been	one	
of	the	pioneers	in	this	regard	(see	box	3).	
	
	
	
Box	3:	Assessing	the	Contingent	liability	of	Disasters	Using	Catastrophe	Risk	Models	
in	Colombia	
Colombia	is	a	leader	in	assessing	contingent	liabilities.	In	2010,	the	government	for	the	first	
time	undertook	a	comprehensive	assessment	of	all	such	liabilities.	Natural	disaster	risk	was	
found	to	be	the	second	most	important	liability	(after	legal	claims	on	the	state,	which	ranked	
on	top)	with	annual	expected	losses	of	estimated	at	close	to	half	a	billion	USD	or	0.7%	of	the	
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2010	budget.	While	averages	are	informative,	variability	is	key	and	100	and	‐	500‐year	return	
period	were	 considered	 to	 potentially	 lead	 to	more	 than	 4%	 and	 8%	per‐cent	 of	 budget,	
respectively	
Table	3 Contingent	liabilities’	assessment	for	Colombia	
	Source:	Ministry	of	Finance	and	Public	Credit,	Colombia	2011	as	reported	in	GFDRR,	2012b	
2.4 Fiscal	stress	testing	
	
Improved	understanding	of	risk	has	been	the	basis	for	fiscal	stress	testing,	for	
which	 decision‐supporting	 tools	 have	 been	 developed.	 	 As	 an	 indicator	 of	
financial	vulnerability,	Mechler	(2004)	suggests	to	measure	sovereign	financial	
vulnerability	in	terms	of	the	resource	gap	concept,	which	is	defined	as	the	lack	
of	sufficient	funding	for	relief	and	reconstruction.	Governments	would	thus	be	
fiscally	risk	averse	if	they	cannot	access	sufficient	funding	after	a	disaster	to	
cover	their	liabilities	with	regard	to	reconstructing	public	infrastructure	and	
providing	assistance	to	households	and	businesses.	The	repercussions	of	large	
resource	 gaps	 can	 be	 substantial.	 The	 inability	 of	 a	 government	 to	 repair	
infrastructure	in	a	timely	manner	and	provide	adequate	support	to	low‐income	
households	can	result	in	adverse	long‐term	socioeconomic	impacts.	As	a	case	
in	point,	despite	substantial	inflows	of	donor	aid,	but	given	limited	domestic	
resources,	Honduras	only	received	about	50%	of	the	funds	necessary	for	relief	
and	 reconstruction,	 and	 experienced	 extreme	difficulties	 in	 repairing	public	
infrastructure	 and	 assisting	 the	 recovery	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 following	
Hurricane	 Mitch	 in	 1998.	 Five	 years	 after	 Mitch’s	 devastation	 the	 GDP	 of	
Honduras	was	6%	below	pre‐disaster	projections.	
	
A	 report	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 (Cummins	 and	 Mahul,	 2009)	 added	 another	
dimension	to	this	framing	and	assessment	in	terms	of	the	timing	of	resource	
flows.	 While	 enough	 funding	 may	 be	 available	 over	 time,	 there	 may	 be	 a	
sporadic	resource	gap,	as	generally	in	the	aftermath	of	a	disaster	event,	urgent	
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expenditure	needs	are	high,	but	the	immediately	available	financial	resources	
are	often	very	limited.	The	timing	of	financial	inflows	for	financing	the	losses	is	
important	and	can	differ	for	different	ex‐ante	and	ex‐post	instruments.		
	
Empirical	information	on	fiscal	gaps	
Although	 there	has	been	a	 considerable	 amount	of	discussion,	 there	 is	 very	
little	reported	evidence	on	the	scope	and	scale	of	 liquidity	gaps.	The	case	of	
Grenada	 is	 a	 notable	 exception	 highlighting	 various	 repercussions	 of	 fiscal	
crisis	(see	box	4).	
	
Box	4:	Grenada	and	the	financing	gap	post	Hurricane	Ivan	
	
Hurricane	Ivan	struck	Grenada	on	September	7,	2004	and	left	tremendous	devastation	in	its	wake	with	
damages	estimated	at	over	USD800	million	‐	or	twice	Grenada’s	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP).	Just	as	
it	 required	 additional	 resources	 to	 finance	 relief,	 clean‐up	 and	 emergency	 rehabilitation,	 Grenada	
experienced	a	dramatic	decline	in	revenues.	The	revenue	reduction	was	an	estimated	5	percent	of	GDP	
between	 September	 and	December	2004.	The	 government,	which	had	only	 limited	 reserves,	 faced	
serious	 problems	 financing	 the	 public	 service	 bill,	 including	 salaries	 and	 the	 continuation	 of	 key	
services.	It	also	became	evident	that	the	country	would	not	be	able	to	meet	its	debt	obligations	as	they	
fell	 due.	 In	 an	 effort	 to	 secure	 the	 necessary	 resources	 to	 continuing	 functioning,	 the	 government	
sought	donor	assistance	in	the	reconstruction	of	the	island	and	in	helping	it	meet	its	expense	liabilities	
(imports	and	civil	servant	salaries).	Despite	over	USD150	million	in	pledges,	only	USD12	million	was	
available	to	address	immediate	liquidity	needs.		The	remainder	of	the	funds	pledged	was	earmarked	
for	reconstruction	projects	that	were	 implemented	over	the	following	two	years.	 In	addition	to	the	
requested	donor	assistance,	the	government	also	sought	the	cooperation	of	its	creditors	by	developing	
a	proposal	to	restructure	over	85	percent	of	its	commercial	debt.		The	final	effort	of	the	government	to	
address	its	revenue	short‐fall	was	to	pass	revenue‐enhancing	measures	yielding	over	2	percent	of	GDP	
in	April	205,	about	7	months	after	the	event.	These	measures	 included:	(i)	an	 increase	of	about	45	
percent	in	the	retail	price	of	fuel;	(ii)	an	increase	in	excise	taxes	on	alcohol	and	tobacco;	(iii)	a	special	
levy	on	incomes	over	USD375	per	month	for	a	five	year	period;	and	(iv)	improved	tax	administration.	
Despite	all	these	efforts,	Grenada’s	fiscal	situation	remained	challenging	and	the	country	still	faced	a	
financing	gap	of	4.5	percent	of	GDP	for	2005	with	total	debt	projected	to	increase	to	150	percent	of	
GDP.	Furthermore,	instead	of	focusing	on	recovery	and	reconstruction,	the	government	was	distracted	
by	the	need	to	finance	the	emerging	resource	gap.	This	led	to	delays	in	the	recovery	and	reconstruction	
periods.	 To	make	matters	 worse,	 Hurricane	 Emily	 followed	 in	 2005,	 which	 caused	 about	 USD	 50	
million	 in	 additional	 economic	 losses.	 The	 Grenada	 experience	 and	 lessons	 learnt	 have	 been	
considered	 an	 important	 impetus	 for	 the	 discussion	 regarding	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Caribbean	
Catastrophe	Reinsurance	Facility	(CCRIF)	in	2007	(see	World	Bank,	2010b).	
	
Yet,	 the	 detailed	 information	 available	 on	 Grenada,	 including	 a	 reported	
instance	of	a	liquidity	gap,	is	rather	the	exception	than	the	rule,	and	at	best	the	
information	available	is	often	fragmentary.	
2.5 Analytical	tools	to	assess	fiscal	risk	and	gaps	
	
Given	 the	 lack	 of	 robustness	 of	 empirical	 information	 on	 risks,	 interested	
parties	may	want	to	resort	to	analytical	tools	to	derive	relevant	information.	
Modeling	and	decision	support	based	on	work	by	IIASA	(see	Mechler,	2004;	
Hochrainer,	2006;	Hochrainer‐Stigler	et	al.,	2014	and	IDB,	2008)	over	the	last	
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few	 years	 is	 available	 regarding	 countries’	 financial	 vulnerability	 and	
questions	relating	to	how	much	and	what	to	insure.	CATSIM	has	addressed	this	
question	 in	 some	 detail	 for	 many	 countries	 and	 regions.	 The	 Catastrophe	
Simulation	 (CATSIM)	 model,	 developed	 by	 IIASA,	 is	 a	 risk‐based	 economic	
framework	 for	 evaluating	 economic	 disaster	 impacts,	 and	 the	 costs	 and	
benefits	 of	 measures	 for	 reducing	 those	 impacts.	 	 CATSIM	 uses	 stochastic	
simulation	of	disaster	risks	by	randomly	and	repeatedly	generating	disaster	
events	 in	a	specified	region	and	examines	the	ability	of	the	government	and	
private	sector	to	finance	relief	and	recovery.	The	model	compares	asset	loss	
distribution	with	fiscal	resilience,	defined	as	the	total	of	ex‐post	and	ex‐ante	
risk	financing	(see	Figure	4	below).	
	
	Figure	4	Modelling	fiscal	vulnerability	and	resilience	to	natural	hazards	
Source:	Hochrainer	et	al.,	2014	
	
For	the	World	Bank	World	Development	Report	2010,	and	recently	published	
Hochrainer‐Stigler	et	al.	(2014),	CATSIM	was	used	to	conduct	global	analysis	
on	fiscal	vulnerability	and	risk.	The	global	analysis	highlighted	the	following	
countries	 to	 be	 particularly	 fiscally	 vulnerable:	 (i)	 various	 small	 island	
developing	states	in	the	Caribbean	and	Pacific,	(ii)	countries	in	Latin	America	
(Honduras,	 Nicaragua,	 El	 Salvador	 and	 Bolivia),	 Africa	 (Madagascar,	
Mozambique,	 Zimbabwe,	 Sudan,	 Nigeria	 and	 Mauritania)	 and	 Asia	 (Nepal,	
Cambodia,	 Laos,	 the	 Philippines,	 Indonesia,	 Papua	 New	 Guinea).	 These	
countries	are	prime	candidates	for	stepping	up	activities	to	plan,	reduce	and	
manage	risks	 in	order	to	reduce	serious	human	and	financial	 loss	burden	to	
exposed	 populations,	 business	 and	 wider	 macroeconomic	 health.	 Figure	 5	
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shows	a	global	map	of	fiscal	gap	return	periods,	i.e.	the	estimated	return	period	
for	which	countries	would	incur	a	fiscal	shortfall.		
	Figure	5	Global	map	exhibiting	calculations	of	the	fiscal	gap	year	
Source:	Data	based	on	Williges	et	al.,	2015	
	
The	 disaster	 deficit	 index	 (DDI)	 developed	 by	 IDB	 (2008)	 is	 based	 on	 the	
CATSIM	methodology	and	can	be	derived	by	dividing	the	loss	by	the	financing	
available.	For	example,	 in	figure	6,	 the	DDI	of	about	4.3	for	a	50	year	return	
period	event	in	Honduras	means	that	the	losses	would	amount	to	more	than	
four	times	the	finance	available	to	rebuild	lost	assets.	
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	Figure	6	Calculating	the	disaster	deficit	index	for	the	Latin	American	and	the	Caribbean	
region:	Disaster	Deficit	Index	and	Probable	Maximum	Loss	in	50	years.		
Source:	IDB,	2008	
3 Protecting	public	finance	
	
As	mentioned,	governments	throughout	the	world	have	used	to	rely	on	ex	post	
resources	 to	 fund	 the	 costs	 of	 disasters.	 In	 terms	 of	 ex	 ante	 risk	 financing	
instruments,	 government	 reserve	 funds	 have	 been	 used,	 and	 only	 recently	
other	ex‐ante	instruments,	such	as	sovereign	insurance	and	contingent	credit	
have	started	to	be	employed.	 Increasingly,	attention	has	been	turning	to	the	
use	of	such	ex	ante	instruments,	because	of	the	delays	and	uncertain	timing	of	
ex	post	instruments	(Mechler,	2004;	Gurenko,	2004;	Linnerooth‐Bayer	et	al.,	
2005;	Cummins	and	Mahul,	2009;	OECD,	2012).	Over	the	years,	given	identified	
risk	 aversion,	 fiscal	 gaps,	 their	 size	 and	 timing	 ex	 ante	 risk	 financing	
instruments,	such	as	insurance,	reserve	funds	and	contingent	credit,	have	been	
considered	to	complement	the	commonly	employed	ex	post	instruments.		
3.1 Risk	financing	and	planning	practice	
	
A	 number	 of	 countries	 highly	 susceptible	 to	 disaster	 risk	 have	 begun	 to	
consider	disaster	and	budget	planning	and	move	more	strongly	from	reactive	
to	 proactive	 perspective	 (see	 table	 4),	 incl.	 Colombia,	 Mexico,	 Caribbean	
countries	and	Pacific	SIDS.	In	Asia,	also	there	is	momentum,	as	shown	in	table	
4	in	terms	of	a	movement	from	ex‐post	to	ex‐ante	risk	financing.	As	on	example,	
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most	 ASEAN	 countries	 are	 currently	 involved	 in	 or	 actively	 considering	
contingent	risk	financing	or	sovereign	insurance.		
	
	
Table	4 Summary	of	fiscal	risk	management	arrangements	in	ASEAN	Member	States	
	Source:	GFDRR,	2012a	
	
Yet,	 while	 processes	 and	 procedures	 are	 being	 implemented,	 the	 budgeted	
amounts	 remain	 rather	 small	 and	 inadequate	 for	 tackling	 the	 increasing	
burden	from	disaster	risk	(GFDRR,	2012a).		
3.2 Implementing	innovative	risk	financing	measures	
	
Risk	financing	through	insurance	and	other	hedging	instruments	spreads	and	
pools	risks,	thus	lessening	the	variability	of	losses,	but	does	not	directly	reduce	
risk.	 By	 providing	 indemnification	 in	 exchange	 for	 a	 premium	 payment,	
insured	victims	benefit	from	the	contributions	of	the	many	others	that	are	not	
affected,	and	thus	in	the	case	of	a	disaster	they	receive	a	contribution	greater	
than	their	premium	payment.	However,	over	the	long	run,	insured	persons	or	
governments	can	expect	to	pay	significantly	more	than	their	(expected)	losses.	
This	is	due	to	the	costs	of	insurance	transactions	and	the	capital	reserved	by	
insurance	 companies	 for	 potential	 losses	 (or	 reinsurance),	 as	 well	 as	 the	
financial	return	required	for	absorbing	the	risks.	The	“load”	can	be	significant,	
or	 as	much	 as	 500%	 of	 the	 pure	 risk	 (expected	 losses)	 (Froot,	 2001).	 Still,	
people	buy	 insurance,	and	 justifiably	so,	because	of	 their	aversion	to	(large)	
losses,	 i.e.,	 their	 concern	 about	 the	 volatility	 of	 the	 possible	 outcomes.	
Insurance	and	other	risk‐transfer	instruments	are	thus	justified	by	the	concept	
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of	 risk	 aversion	 and	 it	 is	 because	 of	 aversion	 to	 large	 risks	 that	 people	 are	
willing	to	pay	for	insurance.	
	
Insurance.	 Traditional	 or	 parametric/index‐based	 insurance	 provides	
indemnification	against	 losses	 in	exchange	 for	a	premium	payment.	 It	 is	 the	
most	common	form	of	risk	 transfer,	and	there	are	well‐established	markets.	
The	disadvantage	is	that	the	premium	can	be	significant,	and	is	a	definite	cost	
against	the	budget.		
	
In	a	Reserve	Fund	amounts	are	laid	aside	on	an	annual	basis,	so	that	capital	can	
accumulate.	The	fund	accumulates	in	years	without	catastrophes	and	can	be	
used	in	the	case	of	an	event	to	finance	the	 losses.	However,	 for	a	vulnerable	
country	facing	events,	which	might	cost	more	than	the	entire	annual	GDP,	this	
is	 not	 practical.	 Even	 for	 larger	 economies,	 the	 fund	 may	 not	 be	 able	 to	
accumulate	sufficiently	before	the	first	disaster	occurs,	and	it	always	needs	to	
be	replenished	after	it	has	been	used.	There	is	also	a	real	danger	that	the	fund	
will	be	‘raided’	for	other	purposes	if	a	period	without	disasters	creates	a	sense	
of	false	security.		
	
Contingent	 credit	 arrangements	 do	 not	 transfer	 risk,	 but	 spread	 it	 inter‐
temporally.	In	exchange	for	an	annual	fee,	the	right	is	obtained	to	take	out	a	
specific	 loan	amount	post‐event	 that	has	 fixed	 conditions.	Contingent	 credit	
options	 are	 commonly	 grouped	under	 alternative	 risk	 transfer	 instruments.	
The	World	 Bank	 has	 recently	 developed	 such	 an	 instrument,	 which	 is	 now	
labeled	a	“deferred	drawdown	option”	(CAT	DDO).	The	disadvantage	is	that	the	
exercise	 of	 the	 right	 creates	 a	 new	 debt,	 which	 can	 constrain	 future	
development.	
	
Also,	 important	 innovations	 have	 been	 implemented	 with	 respect	 to	
implementation	disaster	risk	financing	in	different	regions.	
	
The	Ethiopian	weather	derivative	
To	supplement	and	partly	replace	the	traditional	food‐aid	response	to	famine	
of	the	Ethiopian	government	as	aided	by	the	World	Food	Programme	(WFP),	
the	WFP	designed	an	index‐based	insurance	system	to	provide	extra	capital	in	
the	case	of	extreme	drought,	the	amount	being	based	on	contractually	specified	
catastrophic	 shortfalls	 in	 precipitation	 measured	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 Ethiopia	
Drought	Index	(EDI)	(Wiseman	and	Hess,	2007).	
	
	Mexico:	FONDEN	and	the	catastrophe	bond	
In	1996	the	Mexican	government	created	a	budgetary	program	called	FONDEN	
(Fund	for	Natural	Disasters)	to	enhance	their	country’s	financial	preparedness	
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for	 natural	 disasters.	 FONDEN’s	 objective	 is	 to	 prevent	 imbalances	 in	 the	
federal	government	finances	as	a	result	of	natural	catastrophes.	In	2006,	the	
Mexican	government	chose	to	insure	FONDEN	against	major	earthquakes	with	
a	mix	of	reinsurance	and	a	catastrophe	bond,	thus	accessing	both	reinsurance	
and	financial	markets	(Cardenas	et	al.,	2007).	
	
The	Caribbean	Catastrophe	Risk	Insurance	Facility	(CCRIF)	
The	Caribbean	 Island	 States	 in	 2007	 formed	 the	world’s	 first	multi‐country	
catastrophe	 insurance	 pool,	 reinsured	 in	 the	 capital	 markets,	 to	 provide	
governments	 with	 short‐term	 liquidity	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 hurricanes	 or	
earthquakes.	16	Caribbean	countries	contribute	resources	ranging	from	US$	
0.2	 to	US$	4	million	depending	on	 the	 exposure	of	 their	 specific	 country	 to	
earthquakes	and	hurricanes.		CCRIF	has	created	a	viable	insurance	instrument,	
and	is	helping	with	improving	the	region’s	capacity	to	deal	with	disasters.	Also,	
country	 risk	 profiles	 via	 a	 Multi‐Peril	 Risk	 Evaluation	 System	 (MPRES)	
catastrophe	 risk	modelling	 platform	 are	 under	 way	 providing	 a	 systematic	
basis	and	entry	point	for	more	detailed	information	(GFDRR,	2011).	
4 Toward	comprehensive	DRM	
	
Approaches	organized	around	the	protection	of	 the	balance	sheet	using	risk	
financing	instruments	have	seen	a	lot	of	emphasis	in	disaster‐prone	countries.	
Yet,	can	those	lead	into	broadly	supporting	DRM?	We	discuss	entry	points	and	
evidence.	
4.1 Integrating	risk	financing	with	risk	reduction	and	reconstruction	
	
Figure	7	exhibits	the	different	phases	of	disaster	management	suggesting	the	
various	links	from	risk	financing	to	risk	reduction	as	well	as	to	preparedness	
and	response	and	finally	to	dealing	with	‘surprise.’	Today,	still	DRM	is	strongly	
focused	on	ex‐post	response,	and	the	uptake	of	ex‐ante	risk	management	today	
dwarfed	 by	 spending	 on	 post‐disaster	 recovery	 and	 reconstruction.	 	 The	
globally	information	provided	by	Kellet	and	Caravani	(2012)	of	a	ratio	of	87%	
to	13%	in	favor	of	ex‐post	response	over	ex‐ante	risk	reduction	is	mirrored	by	
case	study	information	for	this	report	for	Mexico	with	a	balance	of	ex‐post	to	
ex‐ante	interventions	of	90%	vs.	10%.	
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	Figure	7	Comprehensive	DRM	approach.	Source.	Lal	et	al.,	2012	
	
Determining	how	much	should	be	invested	in	risk	reduction	and	how	much	in	
risk	 financing	as	well	 finding	a	proper	balance	between	ex‐post	and	ex‐ante	
disaster	 management	 is	 not	 straightforward.	 It	 ultimately	 depends	 on	 the	
wider	 costs	 and	benefits	of	both	 types	of	 activities	on	 their	 interaction	 (e.g.	
financial	 instruments	through	incentives,	can	influence	prevention	activities,	
see	Linnerooth‐Bayer	et	al.,	2011)	and	their	acceptability.	Cost	and	benefits,	in	
turn,	depend	on	the	nature	of	the	hazard	and	risk.	One	way	to	think	about	the	
balance	is	illustrated	by	the	risk‐layering	approach	as	shown	in	Figure	8.		
	
	Figure	8	The	layering	approach	for	risk	reduction	and	risk	financing.		
Source:	after	Mechler	et	al.,	2014a	
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For	 the	 low‐	 to	 medium‐loss	 events	 that	 happen	 relatively	 frequently,	 risk	
reduction	is	likely	to	be	cost	effective	in	reducing	burdens.	The	reason	is	that	
the	costs	of	risk	reduction	often	increase	disproportionately	with	the	severity	
of	 the	 consequences.	 Moreover,	 individuals	 and	 governments	 are	 generally	
better	able	 to	 finance	 lower	 consequence	events	 (disasters)	 from	 their	own	
means,	 for	 instance,	 savings	 or	 calamity	 reserve	 funds,	 and	 including	
international	assistance.	The	opposite	is	generally	the	case	for	risk	financing	
instruments,	including	reserve	funds,	catastrophe	bonds	and	contingent	credit	
arrangements.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 generally	 advisable	 to	 use	 those	
instruments	 mainly	 for	 lower	 probability	 hazards	 that	 have	 debilitating	
consequences	 (catastrophes).	 Finally,	 as	 shown	 in	 the	 uppermost	 layer	 of	
Figure	8,	individuals	and	governments	will	generally	find	it	too	costly	to	use	
risk‐financing	 instruments	 against	 very	 extreme	 risks	 occurring	 less	
frequently	than,	say,	every	500	years.			
	
Budgetary	 policies	 and	 risk	 financing	 options	 can	 in	 principle	 also	 lead	 to	
incentives	 for	 giving	 stronger	 emphasis	 to	 risk	 reduction.	 Implementing	 a	
structured	 process	 for	 risk	 detection	 in	 the	 balance	 sheet	 has	 potential	 for	
providing	 a	 “price	 signal.”	 In	 turn,	 a	 strong	 focus	 on	 ex	 post	 disaster	
management	 (the	 still	 somewhat	 dominant	 approach	 as	 discussed	 before)	
offers	little	in	the	way	of	risk	awareness	and	stimulating	the	reduction	of	risk	
(Phaup&Kirschner,	2010).	
	
While	there	is	no	detailed	information	on	these	linkages	and	incentives,	in	the	
literature	there	is	some	evidence	in	Mexico,	which,	as	one	of	the	prime	actors	
for	fiscal	risk	management,	provides	for	important	learning.	
	
Mexico:	Linking	risk	financing	to	comprehensive	DRM	
As	a	prime	example,	Mexico	is	aiming	at	better	linking	risk	reduction	and	risk	
financing.	The	primary	interest	in	Mexico	on	DRM	in	the	late	1990s	has	been	
within	 the	 finance	 ministry	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 sovereign	 insurance	 for	
increasing	 fiscal	 stability.	 In	 1996	 the	 Mexican	 government	 created	 a	
budgetary	 program	 to	 enhance	 the	 country’s	 financial	 preparedness	 for	
natural	 disasters,	 The	 Fund	 for	 Natural	 Disasters	 (FONDEN).	 FONDEN’s	
objective	 is	 to	 prevent	 imbalances	 in	 the	 federal	 government	 finances	 as	 a	
result	of	natural	catastrophes.	Over	the	years	FONDEN	has	led	to	innovative	
risk	 financing	arrangements,	such	as	using	catastrophe	bonds	to	protect	 the	
balance	sheet.	As	an	ancillary	benefit	of	the	risk	financing	strategy,	which	also	
required	detailed	information	from	risk	assessments,	risk	reduction	has	been	
incentivized.	Fonden	is	currently	promoting	DRM	in	reconstruction	activities,	
and	 about	 25	 percent	 of	 FONDEN	 resources	 are	 earmarked	 to	 (post‐event)	
building	 back	better	 of	 damaged	 assets	 against	 future	 disasters.	 As	 another	
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measure	to	increase	risk	and	cost	awareness	FONDEN	is	also	deliberating	and	
encouraging	relocation	of	housing	in	high‐risk	areas.	Yet,	FONDEN’s	reach	for	
encouraging	DRM	is	limited	by	the	fact	that	it	is	not	a	not	a	government	agency,	
but	a	financial	instrument	(personal	communication;	World	Bank,	2013).	 	
4.2 Informing	 the	 transition	 to	 holistic	 DRM	 integrated	 with	
development:	A	need	for	broader‐based	decision‐making	tools	
	
Moving	 from	 risk	detection	 to	 risk	 financing,	 there	 is	 stronger	 emphasis	 on	
comprehensive	DRM.	Where	is	the	transition	in	thinking	and	implementation	
leading	to	and	what	tools	can	help	to	support	this	shift	in	mind‐set?	
	
Debate	regarding	public	sector	disaster	risk	management	has	largely	focused	
on	the	use	of	economic	efficiency–oriented	approaches,	which	can	be	analyzed	
using	 cost‐benefit	 analysis	 (CBA).	 Over	 the	 years,	 appraisals	 of	 public	
investment	decisions	building	on	this	logic	have	mushroomed	and	improved	in	
terms	of	methodology.	Recent	analysis	(Mechler	et	al.,	2014b)	highlights	the	
fact	that	CBA	and	associated	processes	can	be	very	useful	in	supporting	risk‐
reduction	 decision‐making,	 if	 key	 challenges	 are	 properly	 tackled.	 These	
challenges	 include:	 complexities	 in	 estimating	 risk;	 data‐dependency	 of	
results;	 negative	 effects	 of	 interventions;	 inclusion	 of	 stakeholders,	 and	
distributional	 aspects.	 How	 this	 information	 is	 used	 will	 qualify	 the	
acceptability	and	robustness	of	the	studies.	
	
Key	 challenges	 remain,	which	need	 attention	 including	 the	 consideration	 of	
intangibles,	 including	 multiple	 objectives	 such	 as	 equity	 and	 distributional	
issues,	as	well	as	taking	a	stronger	systems	perspective	on	the	benefits,	which	
means	understanding	how	broad‐based	 interventions	 into	health,	 education	
and	infrastructure	can	create	cross‐sectorial	benefits.	As	figure	9	building	on	
cost‐benefit	 information	 on	 the	 returns	 of	 public	 interventions	 in	 various	
sectors	 suggests,	 this	 is	 needed.	The	 chart	 suggests	 that	 investments	within	
sectors	 such	as	health,	nutrition,	water	and	DRM	all	 reap	good	 returns	well	
beyond	the	necessary	condition	of	exceeding	the	benefit‐cost	threshold	of	1.	
The	 decision‐maker,	 particularly	 in	 the	 finance	 ministry,	 ever	 faced	 with	
limited	 resources	 is	 however	 left	 wondering	 how	 to	 create	 returns	
synergistically	 across	 sectors,	 which	 involves	 enhance	 thinking	 about	
mainstreaming	DRM	into	development	and	resilience‐based	strategies	that	can	
lead	to	co‐benefits.	
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	Figure	9	BC	ratios	of	measures	in	various	sectors.	Source:	World	Bank,	2013	
	
The	 need	 for	 further	 integration	 and	 mainstreaming	 of	 DRM	 into	 broader	
development	agendas	requires	rethinking	of	strategy	and	decision‐tools	used	
to	inform	the	strategy.	For	this,	the	use	of	single	‘efficiency’	criterion	(as	used	
by	 CBA)	 is	 becoming	 increasingly	 obsolete,	 and	 more	 integrative	 decision‐
making	 frameworks	 that	 incorporate	additional	criteria	such	as	 ‘co‐benefits’	
‘robustness’	 and	 ‘public	 acceptability’	 is	 increasingly	 needed.	 	 Such	broader	
framing	may	 colloquially	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 shift	 from	 ‘risk’	 to	 ‘resilience’	
thinking:	policy	makers,	practitioners	and	researchers	are	increasingly	called	
to	look	beyond	‘direct	risk’	and	to	find	critical	linkages	to	the	development‐risk	
nexus.	The	IPCC	recently	identified	on‐going	shift	in	thinking	with	references	
to	 climate	 change	 adaptation	 (where	 DRM	 figures	 prominently):	 economic	
analysis	 is	 moving	 away	 from	 a	 unique	 emphasis	 on	 efficiency,	 market	
solutions,	and	cost‐benefit	analysis	of	adaptation	to	include	consideration	of	
non‐monetary	 and	 non‐market	 measures,	 risks,	 inequities	 and	 behavioral	
biases,	and	barriers	and	limits	and	consideration	of	ancillary	benefits	and	costs	
(Chambwera	et	al.,	2014).	
	
This	 implies	 also	 looking	beyond	CBA	 to	 other	 tools	 available	 that	 can	help	
public‐sector	 decision	 makers	 to	 make	 decision	 on	 DRM,	 such	 as	 cost‐
effectiveness	 analysis	 (CEA),	 which	 does	 not	 require	 the	 monetization	 of	
intangibles,	 and	 multi‐criteria	 analysis	 (MCA),	 which	 allows	 for	 multiple	
objectives	to	be	assessed	concurrently	(table	5).	
	
	
	
	 22	
Table	5 Characteristics	 and	 applicability	 of	 different	 decision‐support	 tools	 for	
assessing	DRM	
	 Opportunities	 Challenges	 Typical	Application	
CBA	 Quantitative	framework	
based	on	comparing	costs	
with	benefits	under	a	single‐
objective	economic	efficiency	
criterion	
Need	to	monetize	all	
benefits,	difficulty	in	
representing	intangible	
impacts,	such	as	value	of	
life,	value	judgments	of	
analyses	not	always	fully	
transparent	
Well‐specified	hard‐
resilience	projects	with	
economic	benefits	
CEA	 Ambition	level	fixed,	and	only	
costs	to	be	compared.	
Intangible	benefits,	
particularly	loss	of	life,	do	not	
need	to	be	monetized	
Ambition	level	needs	to	
be	fixed	and	agreed	
upon	
Well‐specified	interventions	
with	important	intangible	
impacts,	which	should	not	be	
exceeded	(loss	of	life,	etc.)	
MCA	 Consideration	of	multiple	
objectives	and	plural	values	
Multiple	criteria	require	
weighting	involving	
multiple	value	
judgments,	which	can	
make	replication	
complex		
		
Multiple	and	systemic	
interventions	involving	
plural	values	(e.g.,	investing	
in	infrastructure	and	
education)	
Source:		Mechler	et	al.,	2014a;	Surminski,	2014.	
Note:	CBA‐Cost	Benefit	Analysis;	CEA‐Cost‐Effectiveness	Analysis;	MCA‐Multi‐Criteria	Analysis						
	
	
Particularly,	 MCA	 appears	 a	 useful	 decision‐technique	 for	 the	 changing	
perspective	on	decision‐making	 for	DRM.	While	MCA	 thinking	has	not	been	
applied	 significantly	 beyond	 frameworks	 and	 pilot	 studies, 2 	it	 holds	 good	
potential	(see	Scrieciu	et	al.,	2014	for	a	recent	overview).	
5 Toward	fiscal	resilience	and	creating	co‐benefits	
	
Bridging	gaps	in	integrating	government	risk	financing	with	risk	reduction	and	
with	 economic	 and	 development	 planning	 processes	 holds	 potential	 for	
																																																								
2 	MCA	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 DRM	 in	 the	 UNEP	 project	 “Multi‐criteria	 analysis	 for	 Climate	
Change	(MCA4C),”	which	was	commissioned	to	provide	practical	assistance	to	governments	
in	preparing	climate	change	mitigation	and	adaptation	strategies.	The	objective	was	to	assist	
government	decision‐makers,	particularly	 in	developing	countries	to	 identify	and	examine	
policy	options	and	measures	for	climate	change	that	are	low	cost,	environmentally	effective	
and	in	line	with	national	development	priorities	(http://www.mca4climate.info).	
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putting	 a	 cost	 on	 risk	 and	 incentivizing	 investments	 into	 risk	 reduction	
(Mitchell	et	al.,	2014).	However,	stepping	beyond	a	focus	on	DRM	only,	how	can	
fiscal	co‐benefits	be	considered	and	created	by	following	a	synergistic	strategy	
that	focuses	on	both	DRM	and	development?	We	discuss	recent	discourse	on	
risk	 and	 resilience,	 then	 turn	 to	 entry	 points	 with	 relevance	 for	 the	 fiscal	
perspective.	
5.1 A	broadening	discourse	on	risk	and	resilience	
	
The	 DRM	 discourse	 is	 broadening	 framed	 around	 a	 resilience	 perspective.	
There	 is	 wide	 debate	 as	 to	 what	 such	 resilience	 framing	 would	 entail,	 but	
Keating	et	al.	(2104)	suggest	that	there	is	an	emerging,	if	tacit,	consensus	that	
sees	resilience	as	essentially	forward	looking	(bouncing	forward)	in	terms	of:	
“the	ability	of	a	system,	community,	or	society	to	pursue	its	social,	ecological,	
and	economic	development	and	growth	objectives,	while	managing	its	disaster	
risk	 over	 time	 in	 a	 mutually	 reinforcing	 way.”	 (Keating	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 This	
perspective	 is	 also	 stated	 in	 a	 recent	 report	 by	 UNESCAP	 (2013).	
In	the	future,	it	is	clear	that	many	countries	will	need	to	build	their	resilience	
to	 adapt	 and	 thrive	 in	 an	 unpredictable	 and	 shock‐prone	 environment.	 To	
achieve	 this	 they	 will	 need	 to	 make	 policy	 in	 a	 different	 way.	 Rather	 than	
dealing	with	problems	 in	 the	economy,	environment	and	society	separately,	
they	will	have	to	be	addressed	as	parts	of	an	overall	system.	
Similarly,	in	the	climate	change	domain,	IPCC’s	Fifth	Assessment	Report	(AR5)	
Working	Group	II	contributed	to	the	reframing	of	climate	change	adaptation	
with	 regard	 to	 extreme	 climate	 events	by	 emphasizing	 risk	management	 as	
fundamental	to	the	policy	response.	The	report	suggest	as	the	basis	for	policy	
action	 a	 shift	 towards	 the	 essentiality	 of	 managing	 extreme	 event	 risks	
holistically	 (to	 which	 climate	 change	 is	 contributing	 in	 addition	 to	 other	
factors),	rather	than	keeping	a	climate	lens	with	a	focus	on	climate	adaptation	
policy	only	(IPCC,	2014).	
Impact	of	a	co‐benefits	approach	
Synergistic	policy	and	pursuing	co‐benefits	 in	program	and	project	planning	
may	 lead	 to	 impact	 in	 terms	 of	 increased	 investment	 in	 DRM.	 A	 recent	
evaluation	 by	 ADB’s	 Independent	 Evaluation	 Department	 (IED)	 reports	 a	
significant	number3	of	loans	and	grants	disbursed	by	ADB	for	supporting	DRM	
versus	supporting	disaster	recovery	over	the	time	period	1995	to	2011	(ADB,	
2012).	The	breakdown	reported	between	spending	on	disaster	risk	reduction	
projects	 vs.	 disaster	 recovery	 has	 been	 57%	 to	 43%	 in	 favor	 of	 financial	
																																																								
3	Projects	including	dedicated	DRM	projects	as	well	as	other	projects	that	incorporate	and	support	building	resilience.	
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support	 for	pre‐disaster	activities,	and	21%	predominantly	allocated	 to	risk	
management.	What	explains	this	surprisingly	 large	share	of	DRM	in	disaster	
management	shown	in	figure	10?		
	
	Figure	10	Breakdown	of	ADB’s	DRM	and	recovery	projects	according	to	hazard‐type.	
Source:	ADB,	2012	
	
An	important	factor	has	been	that	of	the	DRM	related	projects,	the	majority	of	
lending	has	been	undertaken	to	partially	or	predominantly	support	flood	risk	
management	as	part	of	water	resource	management,	irrigation	and	drainage	
efforts.	 This	 integration	 seems	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 share	 of	 prevention	 vs.	
recovery	is	a	magnitude	higher	as	compared	to	the	global	evidence	on	disaster	
spending.	While	lending	occurred	at	substantially	lower	levels,	landslide	and	
drought	DRM	projects	seemingly	profited	from	a	similar	integrative	strategy,	
while	 for	seismic	and	Tsunami	risk	co‐benefits	were	perceived	small	or	 less	
visible,	and	lending	shows	a	strong	reactive	bias.	
	
If	a	broader	perspective	is	to	be	operationalized,	what	are	the	entry	points	for	
deliberative	strategies	for	creating	fiscal	co‐benefits?	Based	on	the	review	of	
fiscal	risk	management	approaches,	two,	not	mutually	exclusive,	entry	points	
emerge:	fiscal	disaster	risk	assessment	leading	to	the	mainstreaming	of	DRM;	
and	 broad‐based	 contingency	 planning.	 Both,	 albeit	 with	 limited	 evidence,	
have	 potential	 to	 lead	 to	 a	 broader	 co‐benefit	 approach	 for	 dealing	 with	
disaster	risk.			
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5.2 	Disaster	risk	as	the	entry	point:	Fiscal	disaster	risk	assessment	and	
mainstreaming	
	
Mainstreaming	 DRM	 (and	 CCA)	 into	 development	 planning	 and	 policy	 has	
become	the	imperative	and	features	also	in	the	Sendai	Framework	for	Action	
(UN,	2015).4	Figure	11	identifies	the	rationale	and	process	of	mainstreaming	
risk	in	terms	of	factoring	risk,	if	estimated	to	be	important,	into	development‐
relevant	planning	at	different	levels,	such	as	national	programming,	sectorial	
and	budgetary	planning.	The	budget	process	holds	high	appeal	as	it	provides	
for	 links	between	national	development	and	sectorial	planning,	and	policies,	
regulations,	programs	and	ultimately	projects.	
	
	Figure	11		Incorporating	disaster	risk	assessments	into	strategies	and	plans.	
Bettencourt	et	al.,	2006	
	
We	 discuss	 approaches	 on	 mainstreaming	 that	 have	 foundations	 in	 fiscal	
disaster	risk	assessments.	
	
																																																								
4	E.g.,	page	15:	“Promote	the	mainstreaming	of	disaster	risk	assessments	into	land‐use	
policy	development	and	implementation,	including	urban	planning,	land	degradation	
assessments	and	informal	and	non‐permanent	housing,	and	the	use	of	guidelines	and	
follow‐up	tools	informed	by	anticipated	demographic	and	environmental	changes.”	
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Mexico:	From	sovereign	insurance	towards	holistic	DRM	and	mainstreaming	
Starting	from	a	focus	in	insurance	solutions,	Mexico	has	since	taken	its	efforts	
forward.	A	new	comprehensive	programmatic	approach	put	in	place	in	2012	
has	three	pillars	(World	Bank,	2014):	In	addition	to	(i)	strengthening	Mexico’s	
existing	disaster	risk	management	systems,	it	(ii)	supports	joint	disaster	and	
climate	 resilience‐building	 activities	 across	 key	 sectors,	 and	 (iii)	 fosters	
collaboration	 and	 partnership‐building	 with	 many	 actors	 domestically	 and	
within	the	region.	Among	others,	engagement	occurs	between	the	Ministry	of	
Agriculture,	 Territorial	 and	 Urban	 Development	 and	 CENAPRED	 (National	
Disaster	 Prevention	 Center)	 on	 mainstreaming	 risk	 reduction	 policies	 into	
territorial	 and	 urban	 planning;	 with	 education	 authorities	 around	
strengthening	 safe	 school	 approaches;	 and	 on	 fostering	 partnerships	 that	
assess	and	tackle	poverty	with	improved	catastrophe	risk	management.	A	tool	
for	information	provision	is	a	risk‐modeling	platform	that	aims	at	systematic	
integration	of	disaster	risk	information	into	the	formulation	and	evaluation	of	
federal	investments.	
	
Madagascar:	Mainstreaming	DRM	across	sectors	
Having	experienced	severe	shocks	from	cyclones	over	the	recent	past,	and	as	
part	of	work	towards	setting	up	a	regional	disaster	risk	management	platform	
for	 the	 Indian	 Ocean	 islands,	Madagascar	 over	 the	 last	 few	 years	 has	 been	
strongly	focusing	on	fiscal	disaster	risk	assessment.	The	intention	has	not	been	
to	 work	 towards	 risk	 financing	 tools,	 but	 to	 understand	 the	 budgetary	
implications	of	disaster	risk	and	identify	options	for	managing	those	broadly.	
Given	 the	 importance	 of	 risk,	 the	 country	 has	 further	mainstreamed	 risk	 in	
different	sectors.	Officially,	the	authority	for	DRM	sits	with	the	prime	minister	
office,	 which	 with	 the	 finance	 ministry	 has	 been	 closely	 engaged	 on	 the	
budgetary	 risk	 analysis.	 Building	 on	 increasing	 risk	 awareness,	 DRM	 has	
increasingly	become	a	crosscutting	concern	and	investment	 in	DRM	is	being	
pursued	by	public	authorities,	such	as	the	ministry	of	agriculture	(key	risk	is	
the	 loss	 of	 revenue	 following	 the	 physical	 loss	 of	 the	 export	 crop	 vanilla),	
domestic	affairs,	public	works	and	transport	(see	figure	12).	
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	Figure	12	DRM	spending	per	ministry	budgets	(average	2010‐14).	Source:	UNISDR	
2015b	
	
5.3 Holistic	fiscal	stress	testing	and	national	risk	assessments	as	entry	
points	
	
Another,	related,	approach	pursued	with	substantial	effort	is	working	towards	
a	 co‐benefits	 approach	 via	 the	 fiscal	 risk	 matrix	 by	 considering	 many	
contingent	risks	and	their	interaction	with	disaster	risk	at	the	same	time.	Such	
push	has	come	from	insights	gained	during	the	recent	and	ongoing	financial	
and	fiscal	crises.	In	the	aftermaths,	fiscal	risks	are	being	more	systematically	
assessed,	 through	 sensitivity	 tests	 on	 baseline	 macro	 and	 fiscal	 indicators,	
which	 is	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 stress	 testing.	 	 Also,	 there	 has	 been	
increasing	 understanding	 of	 a	 need	 for	 taking	 a	 systemic	 perspective	 for	
understanding	the	potential	 for	complex	and	interrelated	shocks,	essentially	
leading	to	a	multi‐risk	approach	(WEF,	2015).	Disaster	risk	has	become	to	be	
considered	a	key	threat,	and	in	a	recent	survey	regarding	relevant	fiscal	risks	
in	OECD	countries,	disasters	came	out	as	an	important	concern	(table	6).		
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Table	6 Relevance	of	disaster	risk	for	fiscal	management	in	OECD	countries		
	Source:	Kopits,	2014	
	
Colombia	and	the	UK	are	examples	for	countries	that	have	started	to	pursue	
broader	multi‐risk	strategies	in	fiscal	and	public	risk	management.	
Colombia:	towards	broad‐based	fiscal	risk	management	
Fiscal	 risk	 assessment	 has	 become	 an	 important	 consideration	 for	working	
towards	a	more	 sustainable	and	equitable	development	 strategy.	 Fiscal	 risk	
assessment	has	become	mandatory	in	Colombia	and	disaster	risk,	ranked	as	
the	second	most	relevant	risk,	is	seen	as	a	critical	component	of	a	broader	fiscal	
risk	management	strategy,	which	looks	at	the	various	risks	that	are	interlinked	
and	 options	 for	 mutually	 managing	 risk	 across	 issues	 of	 concern.	 As	 one	
example,	 the	 Government	 of	 Colombia	 is	 intent	 on	 upgrading	 catastrophe	
insurance	 requirements	 for	 concessions.	 This	 would	 help	 reducing	 its	
contingent	liabilities	that	arise	from	public‐private	partnership	arrangements	
undertaken	for	infrastructure	construction	and	operation	(World	Bank,	2011).	
UK:	 National	 risk	 assessments	 as	 broad	 based	 planning	 tools	 for	 multi‐risk	
strategies	
The	United	Kingdom	since	2008	(and	similarly	the	Netherlands	since	2007)	has	
taken	 a	 broad‐based	 perspective	 on	 risks	 throughout.	 National	 risk	
assessments	(NRAs)	to	improve	policy	related	to	preventing	and	planning	for	
key	risks	(such	as	health‐related	or	terrorist	focused)	are	being	undertaken	bi‐
annually	 by	 the	 UK	 cabinet	 office	 since	 2008	 and	 are	 being	 published	 as	
National	Risk	Registers	(UK	Cabinet	Office,	2015).	These	assessments	identify	
and	 measure	 main	 risks	 bearing	 upon	 the	 country:	 natural,	 technological,	
terrorist,	and	other	 types	of	risk	 following	a	systematic	methodology	of	risk	
identification,	 scenario	 building,	 and	 determination	 of	 impacts.	 The	
	 29	
quantitative	part	is	finally	summarized	by	a	national	risk	matrix	(see	figure	13),	
which	organizes	main	risks	according	to	probability	of	occurrence	and	impact.	
The	synoptic	representation	of	risks	provides	for	a	level‐playing	field,	which	
allows	for	planning	policy	measures	and,	in	theory,	linking	of	agendas,	such	as	
with	the		national	climate	change	risk	assessment	(UKCCRA),	which	have	to	be		
undertaken	every	5	years	as	decreed	by	the	Climate	Change	Act	(see	DEFRA,	
2012).	However,	it	is	currently	not	clear	whether	this	analysis	has	truly	led	to	
the	implementation	of	options	(also,	financial	risks	are	not	considered).	
	
	
	Figure	13	UK’s	risk	matrix	for	2015.	Source:	UK	Cabinet	Office,	2015	
Note:	terrorist	risk	is	visualized	separately	in	the	report.	
A	key	benefit	of	this	comprehensive	risk	assessment	exercise	is	seen	in	better	
allowing	 to	 coordinate	 and	 cooperate	 as	 well	 as	 allocate	 resources	 across	
ministries	and	public	sector	organizations.	Furthermore,	such	planning	helps	
to	provide	incentives	for	managing	risk	ex‐ante	better,	as	it	anticipates	the	ex‐
post	consequences	and	trade‐offs	involved	in	responding	to	shocks.	As	a	case	
in	 point,	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 cross‐regional	 competition	 for	 resources	 for	
emergency	management	after	large	floods	is	concern	that	has	been	recognized	
using	 the	 risk	 assessment.	 Finally,	 another	 important	 point,	 particularly	 for	
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resilience‐based	 strategies,	 is	 that	 such	 broad	 risk	 assessments	 allow	 for	
identifying	new	actors,	importantly	involving	the	private	sector	as	well,	which	
has	 been	 taken	 part	 in	 the	 assessments	 as	 well.	 Whether	 and	 how	 these	
comprehensive	 risk	 assessments	 are	 replicable	 in	 other	 places	 and	 regions	
with	more	limited	capacity	and	resources,	remains	an	open	question.	Yet,	the	
government	of	Morocco	with	support	of	the	World	Bank	and	the	Global	Facility	
for	 Disaster	 Reduction	 and	 Recovery	 has	 started	 undertaking	 a	 multi‐risk	
exercise	 focused	 on	 natural	 disaster	 risk,	 commodity	 price	 shocks	 and	
agricultural	sector	risks,	which	is	planned	to	lead	into	identifying	options	and	
considering	relevant	institutions	for	implementing	this	agenda	further	(World	
Bank,	2013).	
6 Conclusions:	From	fiscal	risk,	to	building	resilience,	to	
harnessing	co‐benefits	
	
A	large	part	of	disaster	risk	ends	up	with	the	fiscal	position,	and	there	has	been	
increasing	recognition	of	the	need	to	deliberately	plan	for	disaster.	Yet,	fiscal	
risk	management	 is	not	an	easy	proposition,	as	disaster	 risk	 is	a	contingent	
liability,	i.e.	costs	accrue	only	in	case	of	an	event.	Furthermore,	a	large	part	of	
liabilities	 are	 of	 implicit,	 unwritten	 nature	 (disaster	 relief	 and	 recovery	
assistance	 to	 affected	 households	 and	 business)	 as	 compared	 to	 direct	
liabilities	(reconstruction	of	lost	infrastructure	and	assets).			
	
Over	the	last	few	years,	fiscal	policy	and	public	investment	on	DRM	in	many	
countries	 exposed	 to	 disaster	 risk	 has	 seen	 a	 step	 change.	 Based	 on	
experiencing	and	better	understanding	the	large	fiscal	and	economic	burdens	
from	 disasters,	 fiscal	 and	 development	 planning	 has	 graduated	 from	 a	
perspective	of	risk	ignorance	to	one	of	risk	awareness.	This	effectively	means	
that	increasingly	risk	is	explicitly	taken	into	account	in	fiscal	decisions	and	is	
being	considered	as	part	of	contingency	liability	planning	indicating	a	shift	in	
perspectives	from	a	risk‐neutral	to	risk‐averse	planning	stance.	
	
Progress	in	fiscal	risk	planning	has	been	achieved	based	on	the	tools	available	
to	systematically	assess	and	manage	risks	in	the	fiscal	balance	sheet	(fiscal	risk	
and	hedge	matrices).	Better	risk	planning	may	lead	to	improved	risk	detection	
across	sectors.	Countries	have	started	to	develop	broad	risk	matrices	that	chart	
out	 probability	 vs.	 impact	 for	 many	 diverse	 risks,	 which	 helps	 to	 consider	
measures	that	broadly	enhance	fiscal	stability.	Reduced	budgetary	uncertainty	
allows	governments	to	focus	less	on	crisis	management	and	more	on	longer‐
term	issues.		
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At	 the	same	time,	 identifying	 fiscal	risks	vis‐a‐vis	 fiscal	hedging	 instruments	
helps	to	develop	a	level	playing	field	for	investments	in	DRM	and	other	priority	
investment	 areas.	 Such	 systematic	 thinking	 has	 mostly	 informed	
considerations	 of	 sovereign	 insurance	 across	 highly	 exposed	 developing	
countries,	yet	insurance	is	only	one	element	in	the	disaster	risk	management	
toolbox,	and	it	is	widely	recognized	that	in	the	face	of	increasing	risk,	a	broad‐
based	perspective	is	necessary	to	incentivize	risk	reduction,	avoid	risk	creation	
and	 generate	 co‐benefits	 that	 go	 beyond	 the	 direct	 and	 indirect	 gains	 by	
creating	 a	 third	 dividend	 that	 ‘beyond	 disasters’	 contributes	 to	 providing	
resilience	against	shocks	more	holistically.			
	
This	 discussion	 traced	 the	 development	 of	 fiscal	 disaster	 risk	management	
around	four	steps.	These	steps	and	activities	may	lead	to	three	dividends	as	
framed	in	the	project	overall	as	follows:	
	
(i) Understanding	fiscal	risk;		
(ii) Protecting	 public	 finance	 through	 risk	 financing	 instruments	 (1st	
dividend);	
(iii) Working	 towards	 comprehensively	 managing	 disaster	 risk	 including	
risk	 reduction	 and	 risk	 preparedness	 as	 they	 affect	 development	 (2nd	
dividend);	
(iv) Pursuing	 a	 synergistic	 strategy	 of	 managing	 disaster	 risks	 and	
promoting	development	(3rd	dividend).	
	
As	we	have	shown,	all	steps	and	foci	are	seeing	some	activity:	steps	(i)	and	(ii)	
have	been	implemented	in	a	number	of	countries,	and	increasingly	(iii)	is	being	
tackled,	 while	 (iv)	 will	 need	 more	 attention	 in	 the	 future	 to	 truly	 create	
measureable	co‐benefits	and	build	resilience	throughout.	There	is	increasing	
recognition	 that	 a	 broad‐based	 perspective	 is	 necessary	 to	 incentivize	 risk	
reduction,	 avoid	 risk	 creation	 and	 generate	 additional	 co‐benefits	 that	 go	
beyond	the	direct	and	 indirect	gains	 from	reducing	risk.	 	Co‐benefits	can	be	
achieved	 by	 better	 integration	 of	 disaster	 risk	management	with	 fiscal	 risk	
management,	public	debt	management,	and	development	policy	and	planning,	
as	suggested	in	figure	14.	
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	Figure	14	Suggested	integration	of	disaster	risk	management	with	fiscal	risk	
management,	public	debt	management	and	development	policy	and	planning.		
Adapted	from	Holm‐Nielsen,	2012	
	
Our	 discussion	 tentatively	 suggests	 that	 fiscal	 disaster	 stress	 testing	 and	
national	risk	assessment	can	be	entry	points	for	more	holistically	tackling	DRM	
and	development	 in	 terms	of	a	 co‐benefits	 strategy.	These	 two	entry	points	
were	found	active	for	a	limited	number	of	countries,	as	summarized	in	table	7.	
	
Table	7 Adopted	strategy	and	entry	points	for	synergistic	co‐benefits	strategies	
Country	 Entry	point	 Strategy	
Madagascar	 Fiscal	disaster	risk	assessment		 Fiscal	disaster	risk	assessment	
leading	to	mainstreaming	DRM	
Colombia	 Fiscal	disaster	risk	assessment	
and	sovereign	risk	financing	
From	fiscal	disaster	risk	
assessment	towards	a	broad	
fiscal	risk	management	
strategy	
Mexico	 Sovereign	disaster	risk	financing	 Sovereign	insurance	leading	
into	comprehensive	DRM	and	
mainstreaming	
UK,	Netherlands	
(Morocco)	
National	risk	assessment	 Multi‐risk	planning	for	
synergistic	risk‐based	policies	
	
The	potential	co‐benefits	of	fiscal	DRM	overall	would	comprise,	among	others,		
 Improved	planning	processes	for	contingencies	providing	the	grounds	for	
synergistic	investments	into	various	sectors	at	the	same	time.		
 Solid	returns	from	managing	multiple	stresses	and	shocks	at	reduced	cost.	
For	 example,	 sorely	 needed	 investments	 into	 health	 and	 infrastructure	
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often	help	to	build	disaster	resilience	and	at	the	same	time,	mainstreaming	
disaster	risk	reduction	into	these	sectorial	investments	helps	to	safeguard	
any	benefits	that	will	accrue	despite	strong	exposure	to	shocks.		
 Risk	 planning	 helps	 with	 improving	 risk	 detection	 across	 sectors	 and	
identifying	key	public	and	private	sector	actors	for	managing	risks.	As	one	
example,	the	UK	has	developed	a	risk	matrix	that	charts	out	probability	vs.	
impact	 for	 many	 diverse	 risks,	 and	 thus	 allows	 taking	 options	 that	 cut	
across	sectors	and	broadly	enhance	resilience.	
	
Analytical	insight	and	tools	are	key	to	supporting	this	ongoing	transition,	and	
we	identified	fiscal	stress	testing,	national	risk	assessments	and	multi‐metric	
evaluations	as	important	elements	of	a	broad‐based	toolbox,	which,	if	applied	
with	 sufficient	 stakeholder	 involvement	 across	 local	 to	 national	 to	
international	scales,	can	help	to	work	towards	creating	strong	dividends	that	
help	to	better	manage	disaster	risk.		
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